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Intelligence Analysis and the Bureau: The Evolution of Analysis
and the Analyst Position in the FBI, 1908-2013
John Fox

Introduction
The topic of this paper is the history of analysis in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
This might seem ironic to some. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the state of American
intelligence analysis came under central focus and criticism. The FBI’s lack analytic culture and
its handling and mishandling of intelligence before 9/11 came in for particular criticism. Some
argued along the lines that the FBI had a law enforcement mentality, it was a bunch of cops,
good at scouring a scene for evidence, putting together a prosecution case, and turning it over to
prosecution. It was not, they continued, good at the intelligence game, the subtle world of
collecting intelligence over a long time frame, not looking for the quick arrest, and then
analyzing that information to inform policy makers. Against this, the FBI embarked on a
significant change in its approach to the collection, analysis and application of intelligence. It
was to become, according to Director Mueller, an “intelligence-driven, threat focused
organization.”1
There are, of course, elements of truth in the criticism of the Bureau, and yet it has made
significant strides towards this vision illustrated by Director Mueller. An historical examination
of the role of analysis and analysts in the FBI and the wider intelligence community will provide
some useful lessons about the role of the FBI in the United States Intelligence Community
(USIC) and allow us to consider the intertwining of the strengths and weaknesses of the Bureau,
the IC, and even some broader issues about the nature of intelligence and its analysis.
From the beginning, the FBI had a role in matters related to the wider field of intelligence. It
was begun as an experimental collection of thirty-four detectives in the summer of 1908. It had
no name and its mission was simply defined: conduct investigations for the Attorney General.
This entailed matters as diverse as the handful of federal criminal violations then on the books,
including matters like the Neutrality Acts, which encroached on foreign intelligence matters, and
prohibitions against alien anarchists – the William McKinley assassin Leon Czolgosz type, not
the Han Solo type, i.e. domestic intelligence concerns.
With the onset of World War I and the rapid development of Army and Navy intelligence
elements, we see a growing role for the FBI in homeland security matters, including
counterintelligence. The Bureau’s domestic focus is not surprising, given its chief remit to
investigate violations of U.S. law, continued through the end of the war and the terrorist attacks
of 1919/1920, and the back-lash against Bureau actions to identify and ensure deportation of
enemy aliens connected to the ideologies that fueled those attacks. During this period of growth,
Congress authorized the Bureau to conduct investigations on behalf of the State Department, an
interesting, intelligence related codicil that would not become significant until the 1930s.
1

Robert S. Mueller, “Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,”
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Analysis at this time could be said to be strictly tactical nature. In the case of the Army, for
example, it was related to compilation of maps, scouting the enemy, ferreting out enemy agents,
and other practices aimed at battlefield victory. For the Bureau, it was developing cases to
identify the guilty, the dangerous, and to see that they were dealt with through the criminal
justice system. In this regard, a massive analysis was done by J. Edgar Hoover in order to argue
for the deportation of Ludwig Martens, the first and non-official Soviet “ambassador” to the
United States. Hoover’s brief for the court – he was an attorney by training – took extensive
intelligence collected by Bureau agents and crafted an analysis aimed at victory on a battlefield
before the bar.
Whereas much intelligence work receded into the background through the 1920s and the mid1930s, as the political situation in Europe and Asia heated up, the Bureau and the Service
elements began to work together against espionage threats. With regards to domestic intelligence
matters, the FBI conducted extensive investigation to meet State Department, actually White
House, via that codicil about investigations for State, requirements related to the role of domestic
supporters of Hitler and Stalin. In 1939, the FBI, Army and Navy began to divide up
responsibility for domestic security. In 1940, the FBI was assigned to collect and disseminate
intelligence in the Western Hemisphere that was not already the responsibility of the Army or
Navy. This led to the creation of the FBI’s Special Intelligence Service, and some of its earliest
forays into true analysis.
“As the program progressed the supervisors at the Seat of Government were so assigned that
information emanating from certain countries would always be handled by certain individuals
who due to their familiarity with the affairs of those countries became expert in the conditions
existing in the territory under their supervision.”2 Before 1944, these supervisors also compiled
monographs in addition to regular supervisory work and during fiscal year1945 a specific unit
was created to do this. Monographs were disseminated to other agencies including Army, Navy,
State, and Treasury, the White House, the Attorney General and Coordinator of Inter-American
Affairs. Titles included various country studies, “Clandestine Radio Stations Utilized by the
German Espionage System,” “The Free French Movement in Latin America,” “Current
Revolutionary Movements in South America,” “The History of Communism in Mexico” and
“The Philippine Situation.”3
Other positions within the Bureau were created of a simple, but analytic nature. The more
capable file clerks were tasked with combing the FBI’s massive files to correlate information on
any number of subjects of a domestic or foreign intelligence nature. Previously, such file review
had been left to agents, but with the explosive growth of the Bureau’s responsibilities and
resources, the age of the agent doing it all by himself was over, but the Bureau’s focus on the
case, or a tactical level remained.
At the same time, intelligence analysis was evolving, and at a faster rate, within the wider IC, but
limited by its inexperience and executive policy. The service cryptographic elements greatly
2
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expanded their Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) analysis capabilities to deal with Axis codes.
Donovan’s OSS had an inkling that it would be a central controller of U.S. intelligence, closer in
intent to the system then in place in Britain, but it was late to the table and powerful actors had
already well developed pieces in play. Still, the newest member of the U.S. intelligence mosaic
justifiably prided itself on its large and organized cadre of more than 2000 analysts, many
historically trained. There was much talent, enthusiasm, and dedication, but ad hoc organization
and no tradition or practices to build on given the embryonic state of U.S. intelligence, and
limited ability to avail itself of the wider community’s products limited its effect. As
Christopher Andrew noted, this was a truism for American analysis as a whole. The voluminous
products of multiple agencies competed for White House attention with the products of other
agencies as well. This was exacerbated, of course, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR)
penchant for skimming direct reports from multiple sources, some professional collectors, others
well-heeled amateurs, meant that any impact was likely negligible as Donovan had no direct path
to the president.4 And yet, despite the size, as Steve Marrin, quoting Agrell has noted “the early
period of intelligence during World War II “was followed by the "guilds," the time of the skilled
craftsmen in well-fenced, closed organizations.” England, by way of counterexample, had a
much more limited focus, i.e. survival, and so brought a more centralized approach to analysis to
bear, especially on its XX operations, which integrated SIGINT, Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
and denial and deception operations in a largely seamless web.
With the end of the war, intelligence neophyte Harry Truman had a fire sale on Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) components, most of which had been condemned as wasteful and
redundant in a study by Colonel Richard Park, FDR’s military aid in his final months. Park did
value the Research and Analysis Branch, noting that it had done an “outstanding job” but even
that didn’t save the section as Truman sent most of it back to the schools they had come from,
with some few ending up at State, the National War College in the fortuitous case of Sherman
Kent, and other corners around the government.5 Even the creation of a “central” intelligence
agency, under the National Security Act of 1947, federal intelligence analysis did not develop
beyond what it had been during the war.
That did not mean that it didn’t have successes. The FBI’s tactical work on the Soviet problem
in light of the 1945 Gouzenko and Bentley defections, and the post-war collaboration between
FBI and Army Signals Agency (later National Security Agencey - NSA), now known as Venona
led to significant strides against Soviet intelligence penetration of the U.S. Given the need to
maintain operational security for that cryptographic break-through, the Bureau was able to parlay
the analysis and exploitation of Venona into only a handful of convictions – i.e. the Rosenbergs,
Morton Sobell, and the Greenglasses. In those, the public trials were based on witness testimony
by David and Ruth Greenglass, not the intelligence behind their captures, which wound a
complicated path from SIGINT, through the British arrest of Klaus Fuchs, to U.S. chemist/spy
Harry Gold, to Greenglass, and finally to the ring leader, Julius.
The idea of an agency that could compile all source intelligence analyses remained. It was
highlighted not one year after the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) creation in Allen Dulles’s
4
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1948 Report on the new agency. Dulles –looking both to the actions of the CIA and the wider IC
-- argued that “key to an effective intelligence system was for CIA to perform its statutory
coordinating role in operations and analysis,” but, according to the report, the CIA at that point
was not paying enough attention to such coordination.6 One key recommendation to get it
moving along this line was the creation of an all-source analysis cadre to produce national
intelligence estimates. In 1950, the Agency moved to do this, creating an Office of National
Estimates (ONE), to compile strategic analyses for the President and other Executive officials.
This ONE brought Sherman Kent back to the IC under the old OSS R & E boss, William
Langer.7 Kent, who had recently written an influential apology for analysis took over the ONE
within two years and became a most influential proponent of professional analysis. For the next
fifteen years, Kent developed the CIA’s analytic capability.
While Kent developed a theory and praxis for analysis in the Agency, the FBI continued to
practice analysis as it had, aiming its efforts primarily at operational matters. This occurred on
both foreign and domestic intelligence fronts. On the foreign intelligence front, the Bureau
worked well (much of the time) with NSA and CIA and foreign agencies like the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Military Intelligence Section 5 (MI-5) to share
intelligence and incorporate it into the Bureau’s awareness of Soviet and East Bloc threats. This
allowed the Bureau to go more proactively against the Soviet threat and its domestic supports.
On the latter part, though, this led to operations like COINTELPRO (Counter Intelligence
Program), which would be roundly condemned when it was revealed in the 1970s. These strides,
though, did not push Bureau analysis beyond the correlative and descriptive modes, i.e. tactical
focus that it had developed during WWII.
One particular intelligence success, though, suggests that the Bureau did push its analysis further,
even though it did not share the drive of Kent to professionalize it. I am referring here to the
Bureau’s running of its Operation SOLO informants, Jack and Morris Childs. High ranking
CPUSA members who had fallen in party circles, the Childs brothers rose again to the
Communist Party’s (CP) highest ranks, but as recruits for the FBI. Morris especially, between
1958 and 1980, would travel to Soviet and East Bloc nations as well as China and Cuba as the
CPUSA’s representative, taking with him requirements from the Bureau and other agencies, and
returning with a wealth of intelligence on otherwise hard to access targets.
Upon Morris’s return, the handful of FBI agents involved in running Morris and Jack would
record extensive reports of their trips and other actions. The Bureau would then produce memos
on various subjects about which Morris reported and disseminate them, on an eyes only basis, to
the Agency, State Department and White House primarily Morris’s reporting was invaluable,
supplying Kremlin leadership reactions to President John F. Kennedy’s (JFK) assassination
within days of the event, first reactions from high Soviet and Chinese leaders, including Mao and
Khrushchev on Sino-Soviet relations, detailed notes on CP relations across the world, etc. Jack,
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the other half of SOLO, was the CPUSA money man, allowing the FBI to track every dollar that
came into CPUSA hands from international sources, the bulk of the party’s income.
This reporting was welcome around the IC. On December 8, 1959, one agent reported that on
being briefed about SOLO’s recent trip to China, “Allen Dulles referred to the information [on
SOLO meetings in Peking] as being ‘terrific.’ He was extremely interested in the information
furnished concerning the Japanese Communist Party and he has found that the comments of the
Red Chinese officials are being most helpful in analyzing the current Soviet ‘peaceful
coexistence line.’” Of course an earlier Hoover marginalia noted that he didn’t want Bureau
officials telling Dulles who their source was no matter how much he “whined” about it; within a
few years of reporting, though, the Agency clearly knew who SOLO was, but whether it was first
by deduction or by Bureau sharing, is not clear.
SOLO reporting did become part of USIC analysis. With regards to the Sino-Soviet split, one of
the most significant matters on which Morris first reported the head of the FBI’s Intelligence
Division noted that the
“CIA furnished [the Bureau with] a 100 page document analyzing ‘The Sino Soviet
Dispute and Its Significance.’ This was prepared at the request of the White
House...Inasmuch as the document contained a great deal of the information furnished by
our informant 5824-S as a result of his trip to Moscow, CIA requested our authority to
disseminate as indicated.”
He continued that
“We advised CIA on the night of April 6th that we would not object to the dissemination
of this study providing the recipients were informed that much of the material was
obtained by the FBI from highly delicate sources and, therefore, it must be afforded the
utmost security; that the study not be disseminated outside the United States and hence no
copy should go to the Ambassador in Moscow.”
Nor did the FBI leave strategic analysis of SOLO’s reporting to other agencies. The SOLO
team, agents and informants, also produced significant analytic products on various subjects.
These were usually a collaborative effort between agents and informants, especially Morris, as
his insight into the personalities, motivations, and ideology of the principal targets was
unparalleled. Let’s take another example of reporting on Sino-Soviet relations as an example.
For example, a December 31, 1963 report from Chicago told headquarters that they had
produced a ‘History and Development of the Sino-Soviet Rift’ and on Sino-Soviet relations
generally during the period of 1958 to December 1963. This paper was the joint effort of CG5824-S* [Morris] and Supervisor Carl N. Freyman. Other Bureau entities also made use of the
Solo reporting for analytic products. In 1965, for instance, the Research Satellite Section
prepared a comprehensive study concerning foreign funds channeled by communist countries
into the Communist Party, U.S.A., for use within the Domestic Intelligence Division,” which
presented “an over-all picture… of the Party’s reserve program, explains the Bureau’s method of
considering the Party’s reserve program as two separate programs (Solo and Reserve), reveals
the changing use being made of Solo funds by the Party, and discusses Gus Hall’s aloofness
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from the Party’s financial transactions… [and shows] that the Party receives other funds from
abroad, not considered a part of the Solo program, which indirectly assist the Party and
supplement its receipts through the Solo operation.”
Meanwhile, the FBI also created a unit within its Crime Records Division, which combined
criminal identification services, crime statistics and public affairs, to produce research
monographs. The project was called Central Research Monographs and produced extensive
analyses of Communist Party ideological statements designed to track the party’s changing
policies and better inform agents working to recruit party members. Studies of groups like the u
Klux Klan, the LCN, the Black Panthers and others were similarly aimed at ensuring up-to-date
knowledge on groups of criminal and security concern. Other monographs analyzed topics from
FCI matters, through domestic security, to criminal activity. Thus we see monographs on Soviet
tradecraft, the potential for racial unrest in American cities, and patterns of major jewel theft.
Depending on potential audience, these were disseminated throughout the IC, to the White
House, or to other law enforcement agencies.
A third significant area of Bureau analysis should be noted and this gets to the heart of FBI
Counter Intelligence (CI) responsibilities. In the 1960s, as you know, there was a major debate
over the bona fides of Soviet defectors between elements of the USIC, especially the FBI and
CIA. At the center of the debate were Yuri Nosenko and Anatolyi Golitsyn. Though the actual
content of this analysis, in large part, has yet to be released, it is clear that the FBI provided
significant input into the debate both as collector and analyst. Clearly, for the time, the Bureau’s
analysis, though not as voluminous as the Agency’s, was strong.
What it was not, though, was estimative and methodological. Perhaps the most significant aspect
to Sherman Kent's model for analysis was his adaptation of an estimative intelligence process
was strongly shaped by his prewar academic experience, and under his tutelage the Board of
National Estimates seemed to have taken on the atmosphere of a faculty common room. The
other key difference in Kent’s push to evolve analysis was his focus on methodology. As Don
Steury noted, Kent's methodological writings in Studies in Intelligence reflected an essentially
empirical framework that he applied to analysis.8 The Bureau’s did not, nor did it adapt such a
model in the 1960s as the Agency had. This reliance on descriptive, narrative analysis continued
into the 1970s and 1980s as the Bureau produced analyses of the thousands of bombings and
arsons, urban unrest, and many other matters.
Through the end of the Cold War, the FBI’s analysis process remained static. It had excellent
tactical analysis, provided important pieces of intelligence on one matter or another arising from
its work to other members of the community, and it moved towards the use of computer
databases to collect and collate information on intelligence and criminal enterprise threats. And
yet, the Bureau does not appear to have considered the adequacy of its analysis or take it in a
more strategic direction with regard to either criminal or FI/FCI matters.

8
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Organizationally, the Bureau made an effort to increase he maturity of its intelligence process.
Such intent, though, was balked by a number of factors.9 In the wake of the Cold War, resources
were significantly realigned from CI and counterterrorism (CT) to violent street crime, a clear
national concern at the start of the 1990s. Furthermore, FBI computer systems were dated and
stove-piped and would be a recurring concern for many years. By the late 1990s, the FBI sought
to address its growing need for analysis across the Bureau. Its 1998 Strategic Plan noted a need
to substantially enhance FBI “collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence.” The 9/11
Staff further found that “an internal review of the FBI’s intelligence analysis function at this time
found that 66 percent of the Bureau’s analysts were not qualified to perform analytical duties.
The review made recommendations for improvements. It appears that these recommendations
were either not implemented or not enforced.” They noted that “FBI officials told us that it did
not receive sufficient resources, and there was ongoing resistance to its creation from the senior
managers in the FBI’s operational divisions. Those managers feared losing control. They feared
losing resources. They feared they would be unable to get the assistance they wanted from the
new division’s analysts.”10
Meanwhile, the CIA was facing its own issues with its analytic program. Elements of Kent’s
original goal of professionalizing analysis had continued to develop at the Agency as the
Bureau’s analysis fell further behind, but it wasn’t unalloyed advancement. William Nolte noted
that it was in the late 1990s that “the CIA’s intelligence directorate [began] to offer an extensive
(and in pre-9/11 budgets, expensive) program of analytic training interspersed with on-the-job
analytic assignments.11
In a subsequent 1999 reorganization, it created an “Investigative Services Division [ISD],” to
consolidate its international operations and oversee major crisis management according to Cable
News Network’s (CNN) Pierre Thomas. This was in the wake of the attacks on U.S. embassies
in Africa, but before the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen. Thomas also noted that the
division was intended “to improve the FBI's ability to analyze volumes of information coming
from field offices in the United States and operations around the world.12
Along with the new ISD, a Counterrorrism Division was created. Assistant Director Dale
Watson proposed that it work according to a new strategy he called MAXCAP or Maximum
Capacity. His goal was that the Bureau reach its “maximum feasible capacity” in
counterterrorism by 2005 through a strategy focused on “intelligence gathering, valid and
straightforward reporting and tracking mechanisms, effective interagency liaison and
cooperation, and accountable program management.” Across the Bureau, the lack of analysis
resources and expertise meant that such a strategy could not work without significant change.
The 9/11 staff learned that the FBI field offices “did not have the analysts, linguists, or
technically trained experts to carry out the strategy.” Watson’s vision was balked due to lack of
resources, skills, and will, and the problem further illustrated that “The FBI had little
9
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11
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understanding of, or appreciation for, the role of strategic analysis in driving investigations or
allocating resources.”
What strategic analysis the Bureau did conducted within the ISD; tactical analysis was assigned
to operational squads both at headquarters (HQ) and in the field. These tactical analysts, given
the Bureau’s history, were known and valued. The 9/11 staff found that Bureau “Agents viewed
tactical analysts as performing duties that advanced their cases. They failed to see the value of
strategic analysis, finding it too academic and therefore irrelevant.” Furthermore, they concluded
that the “creation of the ill-fated Investigative Services Division may have worsened this attitude
by distancing strategic analysts from agents in the operational divisions.”
The catalysis of 9/11, not surprisingly, changed this. Although the opening months following the
attacks were characterized by the Bureau’s investigative/tactical work at its best, the soul
searching across the government in its wake suggested the significant weaknesses to the
Bureau’s approach. The problems of intelligence sharing and a lack of strategic analysis, not
only in CT, but across investigative programs were highlighted. This was first noted in a report
arising from the earlier issue of FBI traitor Robert Hanssen. William Webster, who had been
asked to review FBI security in wake of Hanssen’s arrest, reported in March, 2002, that
the Bureau must perform the analysis necessary to develop a comprehensive, prioritized plan to
address security shortcomings. The framework for this analysis is straightforward. The FBI must
define the information security environment it wants to create by identifying information
policies, specific threats, and secure usage assumptions. The Bureau must assess threats that
existing security countermeasures do not counter and information security policies that are not
being enforced. The FBI can then select programs, tools, and technologies to sustain its security
environment.13
Later that year, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Inspector General’s reported on the Bureau’s
CT risk assessment and resource management, released in October 2002. The need for improved
analysis was clear and the report highlighted the FBI’s need to integrate CIA experience into the
FBI analysis process.14 In response, the FBI created an Office of Intelligence in April 2003 to
oversee policy and production of analysis across the Bureau. This later became a Division of
Intelligence. Analysis expertise from the Agency was borrowed and recruited to stand the office
up, and the Bureau pressed Congress for more resources to hire and train analysts.
That same year, the Bureau also established “Field Intelligence Groups” or FIGS to serve as a
linchpin in the FBI’s plan to integrate law enforcement and intelligence operations in the field.
These analysis teams were instituted “to create an atmosphere and structure whereby the
discipline of intelligence will infuse all operations conducted by special agents. Second, the
Bureau, through the FIG, says it wants to elevate the importance of analysts within an FBI law
enforcement culture that has long celebrated the role of the special agent and had less regard for

13
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analysts.15 The Bureau also worked to develop intelligence career paths for agents and
professional staff. Such concentration, on the agent side of the equation, was new.
Attorney General in 2004 ordered responses to several commission recommendations including
the creation of “specialized and integrated national security workforce should be established at
the FBI, consisting of agents, analysts, linguists and surveillance specialists” In 2005, the Bureau
created a Directorate of Intelligence, bringing together the Intelligence, CT, CI, and weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) functions of the Bureau; criminal intelligence, too, fell under the
Division of Intelligence, but was not an equal focus. WMD Commission argued that these were
insufficient as the a lack of authority for the Directorate’s management “prevents the FBI from
vertically integrating foreign intelligence collection, analysis and operations Cummings noted
that the reforms were taken in two ways, one saw a continued separation between analysis and
collection at the FBI, the other – “optimists” see a synergy between intelligence and law
enforcement.16
Reform continued as the FBI hired more analysts, tried to stand up a more rigorous training
program, and instituted policy standards regarding the analyst position and their production. In
2007, the Bureau instituted what it called a Strategic Execution Team, to build on and accelerate
efforts to enhance the FBI’s intelligence capabilities, finished rolling out a standardized field
intelligence structure to all FBI field offices.17 In his testimony to the House Judiciary committee
in April 2008, Director Mueller described how the SET was to improve the FBI intelligence
program. It was to ensure that the Bureau’s FIGS, some of which had worked well, others
which had failed, would include a centralized strategic coordinating component. There would be
a Chief Reports Officer who responsible for field office intelligence production. This production
was to be “ timely, of high quality, and relevant to the requirements of our customers. It will
include a Domain Manager who will work with investigative squads across all programs to
construct a comprehensive operational picture of the field office territory, including its critical
infrastructure, threats, and vulnerabilities. This component also will include personnel who will
create a consolidated, prioritized list of the intelligence requirements the office must address, and
produce collection plans and strategies.”18
More recently, the Director has noted that:
“Under the FBI’s new paradigm, intelligence enables a broader picture of the threat.
Intelligence is not collected simply to further a particular case. This shift required the
integration of intelligence and law enforcement capabilities. Intelligence is analyzed and
disseminated to better understand the threat, to identify intelligence gaps, and to develop
new collection requirements, which drive additional action in the field, leading to either
additional collection or disruption.”19
15
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Such changes suggest a movement towards a change in Bureau culture, change which can be
seen in rising prominence of the analyst as a third employee division in the Bureau. For the
Bureau’s first 100 years, employees could be seen as divided between agents and support; today
analysts appear to be developing as a third category, but whether this will hold or not is to be
seen. The production and dissemination of intelligence has also increased, but it is to be seen
how effective this will be in enabling the Bureau and its colleagues in intelligence and law
enforcement to fulfill their missions, both divergent and overlapping ones. Finally, it is to be
seen if this embrace of a strategic side to intelligence analysis will hold too. Given that the
Bureau, in the past, has successfully wielded analysis in its past in matters like Operation SOLO,
it is clear that those who suggest an irresolvable bifurcation between intelligence and law
enforcement operations are premature in suggesting that such changes cannot work, on the other
hand, it is also clear from the Bureau failed efforts prior to 9/11 to reform its analysis, that such
changes may face clear hurdles in the years to come as they are institutionalized.
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